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| Home > CR Sridhar |
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Book Review: |
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Khaki and Ethnic Violence in India - Armed forces, Police and Paramilitary During Communal Riots, Omar Khalidi, Three Essays Collective, 2010, 194 pages, Price Rs300 (India), $12 (elsewhere).
CR Sridhar
 It is often said that the monopoly of violence vests with the state. The coercive power of the state, which is expressed through its agencies such as the army, civil police and paramilitary organizations, is for the primary purpose of maintaining public peace and tranquility. 'All their other tasks,' notes Tom Bowden, an author of numerous articles on policing, terrorism and public security, 'such as the protection and preservation of life and property, the prevention and suppression of crime, the enforcement of laws, the apprehension of offenders, and the provision of a wide range of public services, were subordinate to the function of maintaining order.[1]
In democratic governments, which are multi-ethnic and multi-religious, there are grave challenges to the exercise of state power. This is especially true in the context of riots, pogroms and communal conflicts when the state has to step in to decisively maintain public order. Apart from adhering to constitutional safeguards respecting human rights, the state must be seen to be dispensing neutral and fair justice. To gain the wide support of the public in maintaining order, the exercise of coercive power must also enjoy the claims of legitimacy.
Omar Khalidi, an independent scholar and a staff member at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, posits the theory that in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious such as India in which inter-group conflicts are rife, the coercive mechanism of the state must be fully representative of the national demography. As he says in his book, 'An unrepresentative force makes the state a lot less legitimate for those unrepresented in its most obvious instrument of coercion.[2]
In his study, which contains three essays covering the armed forces, police, and the intelligence agencies and paramilitary, there is a common theme, which binds the subjects covered. The dominant theme of his study is the under-representation of certain minorities especially the Muslims in the security forces and the consequential damage to fairplay and neutral justice when quelling communal riots by the security agencies.
Drawing from various sources such as official directives, interviews with military personnel, journalists and academic scholars he asks polemical questions such as what is the ethnic and religious background of these troops? Does the composition of these forces mirror the diversity of Indian society? Does a disproportionate representation of majority community tilt the balance against effective impartial policing in crises involving minority groups in communal clashes? These questions form a critical part of his enquiry, which assumes crucial relevance in independent India that has experienced nearly half a century of ethnic riots, massacres and pogroms.
When the East India Company raised three sepoy armies for the three presidencies, namely, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, the armies were officered by Europeans while the rank and file were ethnically mixed. The Bengal army's infantry units were predominantly drawn from high caste Hindus from Awadh and Purbiyas, while the cavalry units consisted of men drawn from the Rohillas (Pushtun descent).
The Mutiny of 1857 witnessed the rebellion of upper caste Hindus and Muslims against the British in India. There was a change of policy in as much the separate armies were disbanded and put under the command of central British Indian army. The British followed a divide and rule policy- pitting one ethnic group against the other- in order to maintain balance. [3]
The recruitment of Muslims waned as the British distrusted them but their fortunes soon revived during the Second World War as enlistment again opened up for this ethnic group in the auxiliary units of the army for reasons of manpower shortage.[4]
When the curtains came down on the British rule, the British army had 30-36 percent Muslims but in 1953, the percentage of Muslims in the army dwindled down to 2 percent.[5] In the late 90's the figure dropped to one percent out of 110,0000 men at arms. [6] These figures are alarming when compared with the census figure in 1951 and 2001, which placed the Muslims at 10 percent (8.3 million) and 13.4 percent of the population respectively.
Apart from the dwindling numbers of Muslims enrolled in the army, the picture is far from encouraging in the police, paramilitary and Intelligence agencies. In India since independence, the Indian Police Service constituting the elite officers of police civil service shows in the author's words ' over- representation for all religious minorities except Muslims and slight over-representation for the Hindus.[7] In a table appended to his book the author marshals his argument in support of his proposition that the Muslims are lagging behind in IPS by giving stark figures showing that Muslim participation in IPS ranged from 1.55% to 3.65% for the period 1947 to 2002.[8] In states as UP out of 352 IPS officers belonging to that cadre only 9 were Muslims (2002)[9] while in A.P the Muslims constitute 16.5% whereas their population percentage is only 8%.[10] Apart from A.P the figures of other states show-lagging participation of Muslims in police civil service.
In the Intelligence agencies such as IB, RAW Muslims are distrusted and there is a deliberate policy of not recruiting Muslims as being threat to national security.[11] In the paramilitary forces, the Muslims are not well represented in proportion to the population. As per 2006 figures available showing community percentage in various paramilitary forces the Muslim range around 3.6% to 4.6% much below their population share.[12]
The cataclysmic event of the mutiny of 1857 when the Muslims revolted against the British overlords, antipathy to Muslims became firmly rooted in the colonial psyche. In the eyes of a leading Raj official and historian, W.W. Hunter, the Muslims were, 'seditious masses in the heart of the Empire.[13] This distrust forced the British to disperse Muslims into mixed regiments.
The trauma of partition, which saw thousands of innocent Muslims and Hindus killed, raised the issue of Muslim loyalty. When many Muslim army men opted to serve in Pakistan there was questions asked 'would Muslim soldiers serving in India be politically reliable and dependable under condition of conflict with Pakistan?' would the Muslim serving in the Indian army be a Trojan horse for Pakistan? According to the author, these fears forced the Nehru administration to go slow in recruiting Muslims who remained in India after the partition. The test of Muslim loyalty cropped up in 1947 when India went to war with Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. The wounds were opened again in the Indo-Pak war of 1965 and in 1971 over Bangladesh when bitter questions were asked about Muslim loyalty even when Muslims served with valour in the Indian army against Pakistan.
The demonization of Islam proceeds to treat 'The Muslim' as one exciting fear, fantasy, distrust, anger, envy and hatred and this myth is a part of the ideology of Hindutva. The stereotype constructs the myth that the Muslim other is morally bankrupt, corrupt, rigid, backward, dirty and fanatic. The war on terror with its hysterical overtones perpetuates the myth that every Muslim is a potential terrorist, which is exploited by the Hindu Right like the BJP and Shiv Sena.[14]
Large scale Hindu- Muslim riots, namely, the anti- Muslim riots of 1969 in Ahmedabad or the riots in cases of communal conflicts of 1984 and 1992-93 in Bombay, the pogrom of 2002 in Gujarat- to name a few- have marred the record of secularism in our country. More serious is the inroads made by the Hindutva philosophy in the security forces. The author says the invitation given to Shiv Sena and RSS leaders to address the army has vitiated the Hindu- Muslim harmony in recent times. According to him, the saffronization of the Khaki has firmly anchored itself in the political process and has deepened the fault lines of secular India.
On the role of the security forces in dispensing even handed justice- though the Muslim representation has been minuscule- the author makes some interesting observations. He finds the army with its high standards of professionalism has protected the interests of minority and has acted fairly without any communal bias towards minority groups.
However, the role of the police and the Paramilitary agencies has come up for sharp criticism by the author. Here again interesting patterns emerge for consideration: In the communist ruled states of West Bengal and Kerala the police acted fairly when dealing with communal riots- though the presence of Muslims are less than their share of population. Similarly, in the States of Bihar and UP under the governments of Laloo Prasad Yadav and Mulayam Singh the role of the police has been exemplary when affording protection to Muslims during communal disturbance.
In the state of A.P where the representation of Muslims in the police force has been higher than that of its population, the role of the police remained hostile to the interests of the Muslim community. In other states where the hard right such as the BJP and Shiv Sena formed governments such as in Maharastra and Gujarat, the police played a partisan role and remained inactive spectators while the Muslims were looted and killed.
The coherent exposition of the author is somewhat marred when he makes a loose assertion that the army was unwilling to take action against Hindu mobs trying to destroy the Babri Mosque. The author is possibly unaware of the fact that the army could only act in aid of civil power only when asked to do so by the civil authorities. In this case, it was Kalyan Singh government that should have requested the army to intervene as law and order is a state subject.[15]
The author also commits inaccuracies in factual reporting when he refers to Shaubeg Singh as a retired Lt General when he was actually a cashiered Major General. In yet another instance, he makes statements without verification of facts when he says that Vishnu Bhagat was dismissed from service, as his wife was half Muslim. This is patently untrue as she is a Parsi.
Moreover, he does not make strong case when he says that it was the consistent policy of the past Governments to deny Muslims recruitment in the security forces because of bias and anti- Muslim sentiments. True there were directives issued from time to time (most notorious being Sardar Patel's communiqué) to block Muslim recruitment into the security services but there were also sincere efforts by genuine secularists such as Pandit Nehru to enmesh the Muslims in the body politic. There were complex factors such as lack of education and motivation among Muslims, which prevented them from joining the armed forces. There were other barriers such as proficiency in Hindi and lack of knowledge of local languages, which cut down number of Muslims from being recruited in the security forces. Added to these factors there was also corruption, nepotism and favouritism, which acted against the interests of the Muslim community.
In spite of the deficiencies in the author's argument, he is on a surer footing when he puts forth the view that a police force composed of all or most segments of the society at all or most levels has a positive effect on civic and social attitudes, tolerance and even skills. He further adds that a representative police will significantly do better in enforcing criminal justice system, civil and human rights.
For his coherent articulation in support of a diversified security forces mirroring minority interests, his book deserves to be discussed widely, if we are to preserve our democratic traditions in our troubled multi-ethnic and multi-religious society.
Notes
| 1. |
Beyond The Limits of Law-Tom Bowden- Pelican-, page 19.
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| 2. |
Khaki and Ethnic Violence in India- page 84. |
| 3. |
Ibid- pages-1-2.
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| 4. |
Ibid- page-6
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| 5. |
Ibid- page-15.
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| 6. |
Ibid- page-48.
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| 7. |
Ibid-page 91
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| 8. |
Ibid- page 95.
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| 9. |
Ibid- page-104
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| 10. |
Ibid- page-109
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| 11. |
Ibid pages 156-157
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| 12. |
Ibid page-168
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| 13. |
Ibid page 5
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| 14. |
The Violence of Security-Dibyesh Anand- The Round Table- Vol 94, no 379,203, April 2005
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| 15. |
Strategic Analysis- K.N. Daruwalla- book Review- page 207-
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C.R.Sridhar is an editor of Phalanx.
Courtesy: farm3.static.flickr.com
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