

The formal singularity of *The Red and The White* will strike even a casual viewer: and before going on let me say that I am using the promiscuous and mutable word "formal" in an entirely adverbial sense, to point at *how* the film does whatever it might specially or distinctively *do as film*. In what follows I have attempted to characterise a certain aspect of this singularity directly, without guessing at what *The Red and The White* specially does: and, as it happens, the consideration of form here encourages one to cast in a particular way what that special doing might be. To consider so the human artifacts that films are is to consider them as works of art, of course: and the burden of surface reading is to elicit and abstract such distinctive doing from such detail as sensed surface presents. In proceeding thus surface reading is the precise contrary of deep interpretation: a mode of reading which everywhere seeks to discern, beneath or within the movement of sensuous experience, the operation of such generic processes as have produced those *appearances* that a surface reading seeks to *save*, only, without plumbing the depths they play over.

The most familiar mode of deep reading, of popular film certainly, might be characterised as psychoanalytic: a canonical example would be the thesis of Baudry that the usual circumstances of viewing induce in beholders of film a *regression* to a psychic state akin to dreaming. There must be sociological modes of deep reading, which have presumably made good the old determination, of the editors of *Cahiers du Cinéma* famously, to demonstrate how films betray the *ideologies* that rule their makers and intended beholders; and there may be haruspical modes even, answering to the decree of Walter Benjamin that "one of the foremost tasks of art has always been the creation of a demand that could be fully satisfied only later."

The deep interpretation of film typically ascribes to its makers and intended beholders doings they could not or would not *will*: and the readiest way now to distinguish the surface reading of artworks, as a discursive mode, is to note that the special or distinctive doing that surface reading seeks out must be such as their makers *could have undertaken*, and such as their intended beholders *could have recognised*. The counterfactual phrasing here is forced, and for the evident reason; but the involuntary advent of art upon the artist does not diminish the scrutability of the distinctive doings that would declare works of art as such to their intended beholders. The range of such counterfactual doing may be hard to decide upon now and again; but these are obscurities one must be prepared for in assaying works of art.

The suggestion that a film should specially do something or other as film may strike the sophisticated reader as a distressingly *moderniste* naivete: to which the reply can only be that *The Red and The White* was made in Hungary in the middle third of the last century. I shall not now probe the properly philosophical matter of the extent to which their media are determinative of artworks; for my purposes it suffices that the maker and intended beholders of *The Red and The White* would not have supposed such determining negligible.

To forestall the imputation to me of some "fetishistic conception of art" — such as Benjamin found "the theoreticians of photography doing battle with" when he wrote *A Short History of Photography* — let me note that I take the 'medium' of film to be *the moving image*: and I am using this phrase as simply and as largely as Perkins had in *Film as Film*.

The aspect of form I mean to isolate is a singularity which conditions narration in film. I construe narration minimally: and take it to be *the perceptible construal as concerted action, by persons, of such bodily doings as film makes peculiarly visible*. The reader who has appreciated the distinction just essayed between deep and surface reading will not be surprised, I trust, to find the words “perceptible” and “persons” thus insisted upon: and such conscious agency as makers and beholders of film possess, in the construction and registry of narrative, is the ground of the singularity in question. Narration in film would be shaped by unconscious or subliminal constraints of all sorts, of course; but only such of these as do not constrain narrative agency *everywhere* would be germane here; and I must confess my amateur’s ignorance of such.

Regarding *persons*: it appears that in the world of fact human beings are apt to recognise as persons only such creatures as look tolerably like themselves — generally at least — but in cinema fictive persons may be embodied anyhow: or so it would seem.

What *The Red and The White* narrates is an extended engagement, between a revolutionary regiment and a counter-revolutionary one, in the civil war that followed the Bolshevik seizure of the Russian state. The locale of the action is the rolling steppe around an old monastery, and the monastery itself: which the opposing forces occupy in turn — the Reds to begin with and the Whites then, after seeming to rout them — and on whose grounds there is a field-hospital housing the wounded of both sides. The seeming *crisis* of the film is brought on by the White commanders demanding, of the nurse running the hospital, that she separate their own wounded from those of the Reds. She refuses; a junior is then coerced to do so. But just as they kill off the wounded Reds the Whites are set upon by the Red regiment they had first routed; which has regrouped, and now overcomes them; and the film moves quickly then toward its denouement.

Now our formal singularity has to do, in the first instance, with how the action builds towards its crisis: or seems *to not build so*, rather, and to conspicuously not. The rhythm of disclosure does not, around this passage, mark the killing of the wounded as particularly immoral; or as an egregious contravening, even, of such rules as war is conducted by.

So much so that this barbarity of Whites seems of a piece with their having, a little before, driven the prettier nurses off in farm-carts to a nearby wood, where, decked out in gowns, they were made to waltz with each other before the officers; only briefly, though, and they are let to drift back after to their hospital.

But the attentive beholder has been primed by now to take in without demur such impartiality; and I shall attempt, eventually, to say how *The Red and The White* produces in its beholders an equanimity that is not indifference.

The operant formal feature, now, is what one might call the *kinetic surface* of the film. I intend the term to comprehend *what the camera is seen to be doing* through the course of a film: rather than whatever the camera might be *showing*, of some world or other that its viewers are able to recognise. It seems proper to so distinguish doing from showing — here at least, if not generally — even though showing might be thought a part, only, of

doing; and it is not entirely improper, I trust, to characterise the sort of 'doing' thus isolated as a *surface kinesis*.

The difference I seek between "kinetic surface" and "surface kinesis" seems neither a distinction of *things* nor a distinction of *words* merely, in the argot of the Schoolmen; but a distinction of regard, rather, let me say. The 'thing itself' is best limned as *what the camera does rather than shows*: which may be regarded either as *product* (a surface) or as *productive* (a kinesis).

The qualification "seen to be" is crucial. What the camera may have actually done in the course of making the film helps engender, but is not itself any aspect of, its kinetic surface. And, importantly, the 'seeing' of kinetic surface, considered against the seeing of whatever the camera might show, is a mode of *apperception* rather than perception here: a species of awareness that would *condition* how beholders of film attend to the recognisable worlds they are shown, rather than deliver as *content* their recognitions. I must apologize for dredging up, from a now almost antique past of psychological discourse, a term so uncertain or variable in its current use as "apperception" appears to be: but no other lies to hand, to point at what I mean to: and the contrast between "condition" and "content" implicit in all its uses is what recommends the word.

I should note that I am using term "apperception" somewhat as early European psychologists like Herbart and Wundt used it; and not as exegetes of Kant, say, are now apt to employ it; nor as the immediate successors of Aristotle had, with whom the word seems to abbreviate "the perceiving of perception". Now in Herbart or Wundt "apperception" generically names the subliminal process which ingests novel experience into 'the apperceptive mass' of the already cognised: and as such could not be a mode of *awareness*. But I appeal to such precedents in order to preserve the suggestion of *activity* that "apperception" acquires there. The specific use I make of the word will, I hope, insulate it here from dismissive redactions — such as the pragmatism of William James prompted, for instance — to which the generic use of the term is entirely vulnerable. Benjamin's uses of "apperception" in *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction* indicate how available the word was, once, to literate speculation on the image; and readers who have satisfactorily glossed the term there should be able to easily follow its use here.

The daily grammar of English encourages one to talk of the apperception of kinetic surface: and I shall do so. But it would be more apt to say *the apperception that kinetic surface is*, literally: or *the apperceiving that surface kinesis consists in*: and I must ask the reader to bear this in mind as we proceed.

The adjective "surface" is intended to assert that such apperceiving is not understood here as a manifesting of any particular unconscious process: the special awareness we are considering has no special psychic depth, and would be no more subliminally constrained, or enabled, than any other mode of awareness.

The apperception of kinetic surface must be formally distinguished, let me note, from what the camera might induce or produce in conveying the *point-of-view* of some protagonist. That *diegetic* use of the camera, to show the viewer what a protagonist sees, is usually intended to make the viewer see whatever is shown *just as* the protagonist sees it; and such intent would be defeated, one suspects, by any pronounced apperceiving of what the camera is doing. I shall next hazard the claim that the apperception of kinetic surface, considered as an apprehended condition of content visually delivered, is usually suppressed or deflected in popular cinema: viewers of which are usually made aware of what the camera is doing only in order to distract or

excite them. Popular cinema usually only simulates surface kinesis, one might say: and stimulates its viewers thusly in order to manipulate feeling.

Votaries of the Golden Age of Hollywood might well protest so hostile a claim: and I confess that these animadversions are provoked by what Hollywood cinema has become. But the apperception of kinetic surface would hardly have been encouraged even there: and especially not if the films of the period are *of a piece* with daily life, so to say, in the special ways that Stanley Cavell suggests: unless one is willing to suppose that daily life in America, among the generality of the populace, is an unusually reflective affair. I note, incidentally, that Cavell's appreciations of individual Hollywood films, from its Golden Age particularly, are among the most appealing examples of the surface reading of film.

By contrast with the general tendency of popular anglophone cinema, nowadays at least, the camera's doings in *The Red And The White* are never manipulative of emotion — however else they might manoeuvre our attentive bodies, let me say — and the broad theses characterising surface kinesis set out immediately below suggest, supposing them accurate, why the camera's doings there never are so.

- 1 **The trajectory of the camera is seldom deflected by visual incident:**
the camera seems immune to the visible drama of what gets shown.
- 2 **The phrasing of the camera's trajectory** — how the long takes modulate themselves — **joins the phrasing of depicted action very selectively:**
the trajectory of the camera is variably parallel and tangential to the trajectory of depicted action.
- 3 **How the camera roams the terrain of depicted action is contrapuntal,**
one might say, **to how we apprehend that action developing there.**

The pronoun “we” abbreviates “attentive beholders” now: and attentive beholders who attend to words enough to either recognise thusly the features just detailed: or recognise the camera's doings as *otherwise* than I have characterised them.

The claims just made do not adumbrate independent characteristics of kinetic surface in *The Red And The White*; and, indeed, each of my first two propositions seems a condition of the third. But however that may be — and perhaps because there is never any ‘panoramic’ delivery of action or ground in the film — these characteristics endow the camera with an *ahuman* directedness: even as it seems to turn readily, as a compass, within some strangely evolving field of force. Whether or not such directedness should be supposed a characteristic of kinetic surface itself here, rather than as a further product of surface kinesis, is a nice question: for this directedness is also apperceived. Anyhow, the ahuman tenor of the camera's directedness must be why

- A bodies approach the camera, even as the camera approaches them,
without the fictive persons who animate these bodies *therefore*
coming any nearer the actual persons we happen to be.**

I have labelled this last claim differently because it seems to involve more than the apperception of kinetic surface: but whether that is actually so is again a delicate question. Registering depicted persons as ‘nearer the persons we are’ requires that we *look through* what we are shown of them, so to say, toward *presences* that will survive our

looking *at* them: and such 'looking through' is also apperceptive. But some active inferring that is not *entirely* dependent on the camera's doings would have to go on in our penetrating appearances thus. So I shall regard the circumstance limned in **A** as a formal consequence, in *The Red and The White*, of kinetic surface being produced there as it actually is: particularly because we will have had to apperceive the camera doings in a particular way *for some time* before body and camera can seem to approach each other as **A** suggests.

That the camera keeps persons distant, even as it delivers their bodies to our eyes, might tempt one to ascribe to it some *impersonal* character. But one should resist: only persons are able to be impersonal. Whether or not someone answers with detachment the camera's ahuman directedness depends, we must suppose, on the ranges of emotion he or she can traverse. For example, when the nurse in charge of the hospital commands a junior to retrieve the bodies of soldiers from the river because they *must write down the names of the dead*, we are joined to her and her charges, however momentarily, by a common human urge. But her nearness to the camera just then brings her no nearer us as a particular person: and this joining is effected with nothing, at all, of the 'empathy' that the manipulations of a Spielberg might seek to induce.

Let me note that I do not know, and possess no means of ascertaining, whether or not the apperception of ahuman directedness that I assert here would contradict — or may be confirm, on the other hand — that *primary cinematic identification* of the spectator with his *look* that Christian Metz had postulated in *The Imaginary Signifier*: and it seems worth noting that he does so in the course of considering, "among the specific features of the cinematic signifier that distinguish cinema from literature, painting, and so on, which ones by nature call most directly on the type of knowledge that psychoanalysis can alone provide."

I shall assume now that the attentive beholder of *The Red And The White* becomes aware, well before the film ends, of camera and body somewhat as **A** asserts: if only because the seemingly natural consequence of the camera's approaching human bodies is just such access, to the imagined persons they embody, as is withheld here.

It seems prudent to note that becoming aware of camera and body as **A** asserts is not contingent on *articulating* the camera's doings as **1**, **2** and **3** do; and, to note it again, someone might even concede the fact of **A** while contesting the causes proposed in the latter claims.

But however late or early it may happen, our becoming aware of camera and body thus seems particularly important to how we respond to the accentuated disrobing of the body in the film: which comes to almost ritually punctuate the action. At the very end of the film, to give a striking instance, when the soldiers of Red contingent — which had been regrouping and improvising itself through the latter part of the film, as its protagonist almost — all take off their bodices, before moving together toward their death, we do not at all wonder why they should do so: and their doing so seems, by then, a ritual necessity they almost acknowledge.

But these soldiers will seem to act so, and seem thusly knowing, only if we have not at all asked of them, ever, that they *be themselves*: only if they are fictions who do not admit any colouring of 'character', no matter how individually they come to strike us. Now the reader may wonder whether any cinematic representation of 'ordinary' human beings can be received so at all. The naturalism that is seemingly a condition of cinema would appear to forestall so contrary a prestation, let me say, of the ordinary; and I shall

hazard claiming now that the beholder will apprehend thusly the fictive men and women produced through the course of *The Red And The White* — who are flattened in, as it were — only by recalling and keeping steadily in mind the dictum of Marx that

Ω men make history, but not in circumstances of their choosing.

I trust that readers who have come this far will not find this too sudden an assertion. If the course of my essay has not sufficiently prepared its ground, they might remind themselves that *The Red and The White* is a film from eastern Europe that was made just a little before Dubcek's fatal testing of Soviet resolve; and it may not be otiose to note here that its maker seems to have enjoyed the favour of the State, and now and again its energetic support even, as he had his unusual way with film.

One might ask whether the word "fiction" above — turned just as it has been, from naming such intentional objects as the characters in a novel are, for instance — is not almost evacuated of meaning now. By speaking of characters in novels as 'intentional objects' I mean to emphasize, of course, that these are constituted as such by certain modes of attention: and more conspicuously constituted thus, seemingly at least, than the objects of quotidian experience. It would have been a commonplace to the literate contemporaries of *The Red and The White*, in America and in Western Europe certainly, that, whereas literary characters are actively constructed by readers, cinematic representations are passively received by viewers: and routine with them to ascribe to such supposed passivity the deleterious effects of visual mass media. Were their effortful construction by readers the distinguishing feature of literary fictions one should hesitate, certainly, to term cinematic representations of human beings "fictions" as well: for moving images of men and women seem to impose their imagined persons *bodily* upon viewers, in popular cinema at least, almost as soon as they appear. The enormous importance of casting in a Hollywood film is an index to such imposings of body; and a conspicuous formal difference between our example and popular film might now be summarised thus: surface kinesis in *The Red and The White* does not let the physiognomies of performers become narrative *determinants* there.

The individuation of bodies that the camera naturally abets does not in *The Red and The White* make of them *tokens*, one might say, of any of those *individualities as types* with which, as Cavell suggests, popular cinema populates our world: but that is only another way of saying that the physiognomies of performers are not narrative determinants there.

I have assumed here that, considered as intentional objects, literary characters are not primarily collations of interwoven motives, which readers must tease apart as they take in a story: for were that so, cinematic representations would be as much 'actively constructed' as literary characters are. A consideration of such matters near in time to our film may be found in the chapter on 'ideation' in Wolfgang Iser's *The Act of Reading*.

Literate readers might wonder, however, how actively they themselves have constructed each of the literary characters they have encountered: and the more modest among them would I think cede such honours, were they pressed upon them, to the authors of Tristram Shandy and the elder Karamazov.

However the case may be, though, with literary fictions considered generally, in *The Red And The White* human bodies are indeed passively apprehended as the bodies of individual persons. But however appreciably or negligibly their passive apprehending denatures them as fictions, I shall maintain that it is only by keeping Ω steadily in mind that these imaged individuals can be apprehended as fictive at all. The differing physiognomies of the performers, which visibly announce their individuality, would otherwise isolate what we see of each as the documentary trace, merely, of some or other actual person *playing* a soldier in a cinematic *setting*: and not as the moving image of a soldier in a recognisable *world*: and, exaggerated as this claim seems, it only reiterates that, in cinematic narration, imaged persons must be received as fictions if the human world their concerted movement constitutes is to be received as itself fictive.

Now the formal priority enjoyed by the fictiveness of persons, within the ordonnance of narration, allows the oblique fictiveness of the human person visible there to become and remain the controlling *phenomenal* aspect of *The Red And The White*. But as an apprehended quality of the imaged person, which is sustained throughout the film, such obliqueness is formally obverse to surface kinesis there, actually, and as such enables the latter process to maintain A in some pronounced apposition to Ω : narrationally fronted, as it were, by the oblique fictiveness of the person, our active apperception of kinetic surface maintains A as a datum *more emblematic than illustrative* of the axiom of praxis that Ω declares. That they receive A just so would be what produces in the attentive beholder of *The Red And The White* the forenoted equanimity that is not indifference: and the sustaining of A in such productive apposition to Ω would be the distinctive *doing as film* that constitutes this film as a work of art.

I had noted that the Red regiment seems, by the end of the film, to have become its protagonist almost; and that this should come about without its beholders having *identified* themselves with any depicted person there is an important circumstance. Some congruence might be discerned now, of large intent, with the theatre of Brecht: but there could be no pertinent formal affinity, I shall venture to say, between our film and any sample of 'epic theatre'.

My claim regarding what is produced in attentive beholders is entirely vulnerable to contrary experience, and I would not be able to maintain it against someone upon whom the film did not work so: but these are hazards usual to surface reading. My assertion about what makes *The Red And The White* a work of art does, however, admit some general defence: and I shall very summarily set out its premisses.

- a **If film is a mode of art it is a mode of *visual* art.**
- b **Film could have become a mode of visual art *only as a formal descendant of the mode of visual art that painting once was.***
- c **The craft of painting becomes a mode of art only when literate imagination seizes upon the *final incommensurability* — for all the *initial* congruences there are — between orders of word and ordonnances native to the image.**

Though I hardly need do so, let me note that the word "film" here abbreviates the phrase "narrative fiction film" : which appears to be the formula in common use for the cinematic kind of which our film seems an example. The considerations in **a**, **b** and **c**

do not, of course, allow any ready deduction of the particular claim I have made: but they should suggest, if they are acceptable, why the relation of **A** to **Ω** that *The Red And The White* maintains would be the matter of moment to how the film becomes a work of art at all.

The aural dimension of film does not, I think, pose any serious obstacle to **a**. But **b** will be acceptable only to such as *do not* possess general or sempiternal criteria for art: and to those who concede some special relation of film to painting — a special relation determinative of film's potential as art at all — and pride of place to painting, as well, among the visual modes of art. The reader curious to assess **c** as a historical claim, purely, may consult Micheal Baxandall's *Giotto and The Orators*. But one may grant the fact of **c** while denying its pertinence: and such pertinence would have to be secured by demonstrating the *historiographic efficacy* of the recognitions that **c** asserts, in the decipherment and description of the development of Painting: from Mantegna's exercises after Alberti, say, down to the maturing of Cezanne.

I note again that the 'orders of word' and 'ordonnances of image' intended in **c** are *apprehensible* modes of order: not subliminal varieties of constraint: and the pertinence of the claim to the matter of what makes film art is not hostage, I shall maintain, to the thesis of Lacan that *the unconscious is structured like language*. In Alberti's *De Pictura*, which inaugurates a literate interrogation of the image that shapes painting till the onset of modernism, the constraining order of words is exemplified by the 'balanced period' of Ciceronian oratory; and the contending orders of image intimated there are such modes of composition as would be adequate to the *visual circumscribing* of narrative *crises*, in what came to be known as History Painting.

The temporal qualification in **b** is forced by the transfiguring mutation in mode that modernist painting was: which is supposed to have had no narrative dimension at all, on Formalist accounts at least. Postmodernist recuperations of narrative in painting seem to have been governed by the antinomian impulse, merely, to contradict Formalist dogma: which circumstance renders them irrelevant, in my view, to how narrative fiction films might be works of art. The 'pride of place' painting had once enjoyed — and particularly as the technical development that culminated in film was proceeding — is best displayed by Baudelaire's quip that sculpture is something you bump into, only, as you step back to better take in a painting.

Readers sophisticated by Visual Theory, as that is practised in the artworld, will no doubt smile at my supposing that there are ordonnances *native* to the image: especially if they have been schooled by the likes of Foucault: who had argued that *pictorial meaning will be unstable*, always, allegedly *because there are no relations of vraisemblance, only relations of similarity, between images*. But the curious among such readers might want to test the logic of this argument: by, for instance, substituting "geometrical figures" for "images" in the premise, and "geometrical" for "pictorial" in the conclusion.

I cannot enter upon a defence of the large claim in **b** here; which together with **c**, and the concomitant privileging of painting, imply a notion of visual art that would be considerably at variance with ruling conceptions nowadays: such as those might be, given the *complete aesthetic entropy* within which visual art has been practiced for some time now — from the last decade of the last century at least, according to the philosopher and critic Arthur Danto, to whom we owe this characterisation of the condition of that practice. But our film was made well before the onset of such entropy: and readers who find the claim in **a** excessive, when that is taken sempiternally, may

redact it so that it concerns only the narrative fiction film as that mode had developed by the time our film was made: provided they can stomach at all the assertion that narrative film may become a mode of art only by formal descent from painting.

I should reiterate that to talk of painting or film as *modes of art*, rather than as arts *tout court*, is to imply that a painting or a film *proposed as such* may well *not be* a work of art. I assume that the difference between a painting or a film that is a work of art, and one that is not, is a difference *in kind*: and not merely a difference *in degree*: not merely the difference, for instance, between 'good' and 'bad' painting or film.

In supposing as I do I am, of course, contradicting what has come to be called *the institutional theory of art*: which maintains that artifacts become works of art by the decree, as it were, of such individuals as possess the authority to declare them so: somewhat as, for example, an injunction becomes statutory by the decree of a legislative assembly. The aesthetic entropy which allows artworks to *look like* anything at all, in the anglophone artworld at least, would incline a neutral observer toward the institutional theory. But even if the distinction between works of art and 'mere' artifacts has become thus nominal now, one need not suppose that the difference was always such: and, indeed, to suppose so seems much like supposing, for instance, that the history of law can be comprehended without substantive appeal to the notion of *justice*.

Relations of formal descent would obtain between works in a given mode of art, as well: and I take an artwork to be formally descended from some prior work only if how the earlier one did what it specially did is a necessary or enabling condition of how the later one does what it specially does. I am not acquainted enough with the past of film to point at any work that might serve as a formal predecessor to *The Red And The White*. But whether there are any such or not, the plausibility of my latter claim regarding **A** and **Ω** would depend very much on whether or not the moving image can be *emblematic* at all: on whether the moving image can sustain some relation with words that is at all analogous to such relations between word and image as the visual emblem had once sustained. So large a question cannot be answered in the course of such an exercise as this, of course: and I have raised it to emphasize just how chancy the business of surface reading is.

One way of testing the matter here would be to set *The Red And The White* beside a contemporary historical reconstruction of some similar military engagement, done in a documentary manner, and to see then if the distinction between emblems and illustrations, considered as generically as possible, is of any use in grasping their formal difference. That exercise would be considerably complicated, needless to say, by the circumstance that the visual emblem comes into its own during the Renaissance, and seems to lapse from any pointed or subtle use thereafter.

I should note that my speculations on how films may be works of art have taken no account, at all, of what have come to be called *art films*. But the omission will be pardoned, I trust, if the criteria that have been discerned for such films — by David Bordwell, for instance — adequately comprehend that cinematic species: because the art in the art film seems to consist *entirely* in contravening the conventions of popular film.

I shall close by noting that the distinction between surface reading and deep interpretation seems to have been probed by Danto first, in *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art*; and his *Embodied Meanings* displays surface readings of seemingly hermetic works of visual art. Cavell's appreciations of popular film have

already been mentioned in this connection; and the essays of individual films collected in Noel Carroll's *Interpreting the Moving Image* are instructive and exemplary surface readings. But I should mention that *interpretation as explanation* is how Carroll characterises his manner of reading there: and that seems a more expansive mode than surface reading as I understand it, for bodies of work as well may be interpreted explanatorily: and what a clutch of films may distinctively do, taken together, might prove impossible for any one of them to specially do. I note as well that the special doings I take surface reading to elicit are not Danto's embodied meanings: because those significations — themselves: and not their conditions, merely — seem always articulable with words.

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